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The release from proactive interference (PI) is a well-studied phenomenon, but its 
cause is elusive. When a release in PI is caused by changes in the content of to-be-
remembered items, the more accurate retrieval is likely a result of changes in context 
(Watkins & Watkins, 1975). However, changes in context do not readily explain the 
cause of PI release resulting from a temporal delay. Instead, it could be that during the 
delay subjects disengage from intrusive information from previous trials. The ability to 
disengage from no-longer-relevant information is related to fluid intelligence (Gf). I 
predicted that this ability to disengage, as defined by fluid intelligence, is the driving 
factor of the time-based release from PI. In order to test this prediction, I administered a 
free recall task to individuals of high and low Gf. The time between the last two lists was 
lengthened to cause release. The time manipulation did not cause a release from PI; 
essentially, this result represents a failure to replicate. Limitations of the study and 










Despite what may seem intuitively obvious, memories for past events do not 
simply fade over time. Forgetting is more analogous to losing an item; it still exists, but it 
cannot be found. The loss of these items in long-term memory is often due to proactive 
interference (PI) – that is, the tendency for past memories to interfere with the retrieval of 
newer memories (Postman, 1961). Even though the causes of forgetting in long-term 
memory had been well established, there was contention over whether or not short-term 
memory operated under similar principles. Some researchers argued that, rather than 
through interference, forgetting in short-term memory occurred as a result of the memory 
trace decaying (Peterson & Peterson, 1959). However, with research from Keppel and 
Underwood (1962) and others that followed them, it became increasingly apparent that 
forgetting in long-term memory and short-term memory both occurred as a result of 
interference. 
The PI release paradigm became particularly prevalent in supporting the 
interference side of the debate. Typical research in the paradigm showed that the 
forgetting caused by interference could be alleviated by changing aspects of the to-be-
remembered material (Wickens, 1970). Research has found that this increase can be 
explained under a contextual view of memory. This perspective of memory stated that 
aspects of the environment are encoded alongside the critical material. Large amounts of 
overlap in these random contextual elements at different encoding times lead to large 
amounts of PI (Watkins & Watkins, 1975). It followed logically that changing aspects of 
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the to-be-remembered material changed the context of encoding, leading to a decrease in 
the amount of PI. 
However, there is a second type of PI release that is not as easily explained. 
Namely, it has been found that increasing the time between encoding decreases the 
amount of PI (Kincaid & Wickens, 1970). This result is difficult to incorporate into the 
contextual view of memory; the content of the to-be-remembered material remains 
constant, yet the amount of PI reduces. It has been argued that larger intervals of time 
allow more variation in the random contextual elements that are encoded (Gorfein, 1987). 
As a result, the contextual cues used in the present will more closely match the context of 
more recent encoding episodes, making them easier to retrieve. However, even direct 
manipulations of context have failed to cause a release from PI (see, for instance, 
MacLeod, 1975). Thus, the extent to which PI can be released from random changes in 
context occurring in a controlled experimental setting is questionable. There may be 
some other mechanism that causes a reduction in PI over time. 
 Shipstead and Engle (2012) suggested that fluid intelligence (i.e., novel reasoning 
ability) may be related to forgetting. Contrary to intuition, they stated that individuals 
who are higher in this fluid intelligence ability are more capable of forgetting extraneous 
information. Following their research, I propose that the cause of the time-based release 
from PI is related to this fluid intelligence ability. Thus, I will take an individual 
differences approach to show that individuals of higher fluid intelligence show a greater 
release from PI over time than do individuals who are lower in fluid intelligence. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A HISTORY OF PI RELEASE 
 
Interference vs. Decay 
 The idea that human memory is divided into two systems, primary (short-term) 
memory and secondary (long-term) memory (James, 1890), has prompted countless 
questions in the field of psychology. One of these questions – how do we forget? – 
prompted a large-scale debate between two competing theories: forgetting through 
interference, and forgetting through trace decay. Research in the 1950s showed decisively 
that forgetting in long-term memory was governed by interference (Postman, 1961). 
However, the cause of forgetting in short-term memory turned out to be much less 
simple. 
Peterson and Peterson (1959) predicted that items within short-term memory 
decayed over time. They gave subjects 3-letter strings, which they called trigrams, and 
asked them to recall the strings after a variable period of time. Subject accuracy sharply 
decreased as this period of time, the retention interval, was increased. However, Keppel 
and Underwood (1962), using the same task, showed that forgetting in short-term 
memory instead occurred as a result of proactive interference building up across trials. 
The critical difference was in the way accuracy was analyzed; Keppel and Underwood 
looked at accuracy across trials rather than over time. They found substantial amounts of 
forgetting as more trials had been completed, but the length of the retention interval itself 
did not hinder accuracy. 
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Release from Proactive Interference 
  
More evidence for the interference account came from Wickens, Born, and Allen 
(1963). They found that the forgetting seen in the Peterson task could be reversed if the 
class of material being learned was changed – a phenomenon known as the release from 
PI. The typical PI release paradigm involved a variation of the Peterson task. Subjects 
were presented trigrams which they were asked to recall after a retention interval. All 
trigrams preceding the last trial were drawn from the same class of material (e.g., all were 
letters or digits), and the final trial contained material of a different class. The magnitude 
of the PI release was dependent on how disparate the two classes of information were. 
For instance, a greater PI release was found when switching from fruit words to 
profession words rather than from fruits to vegetables (Wickens, Dalezman, & 
Eggemeier, 1976). These content switches were not limited to semantic changes; changes 
in content language and content modality (i.e., visually presented vs. orally presented) 
also produced a large PI release (Wickens, 1970). 
 Kincaid and Wickens (1970) showed that a release from PI could also be obtained 
by manipulating time. They gave subjects several trials of the Peterson task; however, 
they changed the length of time between the last two trials (the inter-trial interval; ITI) 
rather than the content of the trigrams. Accuracy for the last trigram increased as the ITI 
lengthened, out to 45 seconds. They suggested that the interfering memory traces decayed 
over time. However, a study by Turvey, Brick, and Osborn (1970) showed that relative 
time is more important than absolute time with respect to interference effects. Essentially, 
increasing the ITI increased the distinctiveness of the current trial, while the previous 
trials blended together. 
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Mechanisms of the Release 
Although the buildup and release of proactive interference are very robust 
findings within the psychological literature, the mechanisms that produce these effects in 
a memory task have not clearly been explained. Two potential hypotheses were proposed 
by Wickens (1970). The first one, the attentional hypothesis, stated that the loss of 
accuracy across trials is a product of waning attention. As the task proceeds, the use of 
attentional resources decreases, so the encoding of new items becomes less effective. The 
increase of accuracy observed on the release trial is a result of the subject reengaging 
attention, making encoding more effective. Engle (1975) tested this hypothesis using 
pupil size as an index of attention (i.e., more dilation indicates more attention). As the 
hypothesis predicted, pupil size decreased with successive trials. However, pupil size did 
not increase on the release trial, suggesting that the attentional hypothesis was incorrect.  
The second hypothesis, the cue overload hypothesis, suggested that PI effects 
were a result of changing effectiveness of cues used to retrieve items from secondary 
memory (Watkins & Watkins, 1975). As more trials occurred, a single retrieval cue 
became associated with an increasing amount of items; the probability of recalling a 
correct response decreased due to the sheer number of intruding responses. When there 
was a switch in item content, however, a different retrieval cue was used – one with 
fewer associated responses. Gardiner, Craik, and Birtwistle (1972) provided support for 
this hypothesis. Rather than the Peterson task, they used an immediate free recall task to 
look at PI effects. The content switch was between two subcategories of a larger 
category; for instance, subjects would see wildflower words on the buildup trials and 
garden flowers on the release trial – both of which were part of the more general “flower” 
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category. When they were provided the subcategory name after presentation of the final 
trial words, PI release occurred. However, if the subcategory name was not provided, 
there was no evidence of release. Essentially, the name was used as a new cue to retrieve 
items from secondary memory, thus increasing recall accuracy. The group that did not 
receive the subcategory name presumably used the same cue as the previous trials, so 
accuracy did not increase. 
Researchers have also focused on how individual differences in ability are related 
to PI effects. This research has paid particular interest to individual differences in 
working memory capacity (WMC), due to its importance in retrieval and blocking 
interference (e.g., Rosen & Engle, 1997; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). While WMC 
consistently relates to the buildup of PI, so far there has been only negative evidence for 
the role of working memory in PI release (Kane & Engle, 2000). Bunting (2006) looked 
at the relationship between fluid intelligence (Gf) and proactive interference. Fluid 
intelligence is similarly related to the buildup of PI, but is less important in PI release; the 
correlation to Gf becomes weaker after release. 
 Nearly all of the research examining the mechanisms of PI release has focused on 
content-related release. It is a general assumption that all PI release operates under the 
same mechanisms. However, there is evidence suggesting that the time-related release 
and content-related release are different. For instance, the magnitude of PI release 
observed from a change in content is typically greater than that observed from a change 
in time; the initial content-related release study had a PI release of 91%, compared to the 
release of 74% in the first time-related release study (Wickens, Born, & Allen, 1963; 
Kincaid & Wickens, 1970). Also, adopting the view of Gorfein (1987), the time-based 
release may be affected by changes in random contextual elements in the environment 
due to differences in time between trials. The relative time between trials in a content-
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release is constant, so environmental context plays less of a role. These discrepancies 
warrant an analysis of the mechanisms behind the time-related release from PI. I believe 
that this discrepancy can be solved by examining individual differences in performance; 
subjects who are better at disengaging from intruding information should be more 




METHOD AND MATERIALS 
 
Subjects 
Subjects were selected from an existing database within the Attention and 
Working Memory Lab. Selection criteria included being between the ages of 18 and 35, 
having normal eyesight and hearing, and being in the top or bottom quartile of fluid 
intelligence. An individual’s Gf score was computed as a z-score composite from 
performance on the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 
1998), Letter Sets (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976), and Number Series 
(Thurstone, 1938) tasks administered previously in a screening procedure. A total of 80 
individuals participated in this study – 40 subjects from the top quartile of Gf scores, and 
40 from the bottom quartile. One subject did not follow instructions and was therefore 
not included in the analyses. Subjects were compensated with a twenty dollar check upon 
completion. 
Design 
 The experiment was 2x2x5 mixed factorial design. High and low Gf subjects 
completed five trials of a free recall task. Fluid intelligence is a blocking variable. The 
ITI between the last two (pre- and post-release) trials is a between-subjects variable. The 
ITI between all lists is 6 seconds for the control group. For the experimental group, the 
ITI between the first four trials is 6 seconds; however, the ITI between the last two trials 
is 144 seconds. The 144 second interval corresponds to the 45 second ITI used by 
Kincaid and Wickens (1970). Their 45 second ITI was three times the combined length of 
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their retention interval and recall interval (10 seconds and 5 seconds, respectively). 
Likewise, the experimental ITI of 144 seconds is three times the length of the combined 
retention (18 seconds) and recall (30 seconds) intervals. Additionally, trial number is a 
within-subjects variable; the analyses focus on the last two trials. The dependent 
variables of interest are recall accuracy. Recall accuracy is calculated as the total number 
of correct responses divided by the number of words in the list. 
 The 60 experimental words were selected to be concrete nouns with one syllable 
and five letters. These words were randomized into the 5 experimental lists. These lists 
were then counterbalanced. The analyses combine all of the word counterbalance 
conditions. 
Materials 
 The task was on computers using E-Prime 2.0. Subjects were run in a sound-proof 
booth to block out distracting sounds. Responses were recorded using a microphone in 
order to obtain accurate times for each response. 
Procedure 
 Subjects were randomly assigned to the ITI conditions when they entered the lab. 
Subjects were run in separate rooms, so that the speaking of each subject would not be a 
distraction to the others. After giving consent, subjects were taken into a sound-proof 
booth to start the task. The subjects performed 5 lists of a free recall task, interlaced with 
an antisaccade task (Hallet, 1978) between lists. They were told that the study assessed 
multi-tasking ability, so performance on both parts was important. Each free recall list 
contained twelve 5-letter nouns. Each word was presented for 750 ms, followed by a 250 
ms delay. Following the presentation of the last word was an 18 s retention interval. A 
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retention interval was used to displace items into secondary memory, and therefore 
maximize the amount of PI (Craik & Birwistle, 1971). During the retention interval, 
subjects performed prosaccade and antisaccade trials (Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 
2004) to prevent rehearsal (henceforth called the rehearsal preventative task). Each trial 
lasted 6 s. At the beginning of each trial, a circle (indicating a prosaccade trial) or triangle 
(indicating an antisaccade trial) was displayed in the center of the screen for 1,500 ms. A 
“+” fixation point was then presented for 1,000 ms, immediately after which a “*” 
flashed on one side of the screen for 200 ms. Following this flash, the target letter (“O” or 
“Q”) appeared on the opposite side of the screen for 300 ms and was immediately 
masked. The subject had to indicate which letter appeared by pressing the corresponding 
key on the keyboard; subjects had 3,000 ms to give an answer. At the end of the retention 
interval, a recall screen appeared prompting subjects to say into a microphone the words 
they can remember from the previous list. Subjects were given 30 s to recall as many 
words as they can. After the recall period ended, there was an inter-trial interval of 6 s, 
during which subjects again performed the rehearsal preventative task. After the ITI, 
subjects received the next list of words. Prior to the final trial, some subjects received an 
ITI of 144 s rather than 6 s; subjects did the rehearsal preventative task during this time 
as well.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Average recall accuracies for each condition are shown in Table 1. PI release is 
negative for the short ITI conditions, suggesting further buildup of PI. On the other hand, 
the long ITI conditions have positive release values, suggesting an increase in accuracy 
on list five. Figure 1 displays recall accuracy graphically. There is not much decrease in 
accuracy from list one to list four in any group, and the increase in accuracy on list five is 
not particularly massive. 
 A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was employed to analyze the data, with fluid 
intelligence (high, low) as a between-subjects factor, inter-trial interval (6 s, 144 s) as a 
between-subjects factor, and trial number (pre-release trial, post-release trial) as a within-
subjects factor (the results of which are presented in Table 2). There is a main effect of 
fluid intelligence on accuracy; subjects with high Gf did better on the recall test than low 
Gf subjects. However, no other effects were significant. Critically, the two-way 
interaction between ITI and trial number is not significant; F(1,75) = 2.01, p = .16. 
 The lack of a ITI x Trial Number interaction suggests that PI release was not 
obtained; accuracy on the final list was not greater than the previous list after a long 
delay. This seriously limits the ability to make any meaningful conclusions about the 
data. There cannot be a difference in release between the fluid intelligence groups if no PI 
release was obtained in the first place. Thus, the role of fluid intelligence in the time-
based release from PI cannot be assessed in this study. 
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 The lack of PI release likely stemmed from one (or a combination) of three issues: 
(1) use of a free recall task to build up PI, (2) use of prosaccade and antisaccade as the 
rehearsal preventative task, and/or (3) error in using only one data point. The free recall 
task used here contained twelve words per list; this is much higher than the number of 
items used by Peterson and Peterson (1959). It could be that all of the PI buildup 
occurred within-list, and that PI was completely release between lists. This would explain 
the large difference in accuracy on the first trial, as well as the relatively flat distribution 
of accuracy across the five trials for all groups. Despite what seemed intuitive at the time 
the study was designed, the prosaccade and antisaccade trials may have failed to prevent 
subjects from rehearsing items. This would result in high Gf subjects performing much 
better than low Gf subjects, and low PI buildup. Again, this pattern was obtained in this 
dataset. Lastly, measurement error is high when only one data point is used (in this case, 
the difference between list 5 and list 4). A more robust, less error-prone measure of 
release could have been obtained if the free recall task was doubled or tripled. 
 Thus, the research question remains: what causes the time-based release from PI? 
Gorfein (1987) currently provides the best explanation for the phenomenon, but further 
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Table 1 : Mean accuracy for the dependent variables
Condition List 1 Accuracy List 2 Accuracy List 3 Accuracy List 4 Accuracy List 5 Accuracy PI Release
High Gf, 6 s ITI 6.00 4.50 4.75 5.35 5.05 -0.30
High Gf, 144 s ITI 5.75 4.80 4.60 5.10 5.30 0.20
Low Gf, 6 s ITI 3.53 2.95 2.68 2.68 2.58 -0.10
High Gf, 144 s ITI 3.80 2.80 2.65 2.70 3.25 0.55
The list accuracy values reflect the average number of words correctly recalled for that list. 
PI Release is the average difference between list 4 and list 5 accuracy
Table 2 : ANOVA summary table
Source SS df MS F p
List Number 0.29 1.00 0.29 0.18 0.67
Gf Group 226.79 1.00 226.79 58.43 <.001
ITI Group 1.16 1.00 1.16 0.30 0.59
ListxGf 0.73 1.00 0.73 0.45 0.51
ListxITI 3.29 1.00 3.29 2.01 0.16
GfxITI 1.16 1.00 1.16 0.30 0.59
ListxGfxITI 0.06 1.00 0.06 0.04 0.85
Error 291.12 72.00 4.04
Total 524.60 79.00
List Number represents list 4 and list 5 accuracy. Gf Group represents the Gf manipulation,
and ITI Group represents the delay manipulation.
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Figure 1. Free recall accuracy for each list of words. 
